RESUMO
Initial COVID-19 containment in the United States focused on limiting mobility, including school and workplace closures. However, these interventions have had enormous societal and economic costs. Here we demonstrate the feasibility of an alternative control strategy, test-trace-quarantine: routine testing of primarily symptomatic individuals, tracing and testing their known contacts, and placing their contacts in quarantine. We performed this analysis using Covasim, an open-source agent-based model, which was calibrated to detailed demographic, mobility, and epidemiological data for the Seattle region from January through June 2020. With current levels of mask use and schools remaining closed, we found that high but achievable levels of testing and tracing are sufficient to maintain epidemic control even under a return to full workplace and community mobility and with low vaccine coverage. The easing of mobility restrictions in June 2020 and subsequent scale-up of testing and tracing programs through September provided real-world validation of our predictions. Although we show that test-trace-quarantine can control the epidemic in both theory and practice, its success is contingent on high testing and tracing rates, high quarantine compliance, relatively short testing and tracing delays, and moderate to high mask use. Thus, in order for test-trace-quarantine to control transmission with a return to high mobility, strong performance in all aspects of the program is required.
RESUMO
BackgroundCoronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), the respiratory disease caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was first identified in Wuhan, China and has since become pandemic. As part of initial response activities in the United States, enhanced contact investigations were conducted to enable early identification and isolation of additional cases and to learn more about risk factors for transmission. MethodsClose contacts of nine early travel-related cases in the United States were identified. Close contacts meeting criteria for active monitoring were followed, and selected individuals were targeted for collection of additional exposure details and respiratory samples. Respiratory samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. ResultsThere were 404 close contacts who underwent active monitoring in the response jurisdictions; 338 had at least basic exposure data, of whom 159 had [≥]1 set of respiratory samples collected and tested. Across all known close contacts under monitoring, two additional cases were identified; both secondary cases were in spouses of travel-associated case patients. The secondary attack rate among household members, all of whom had [≥]1 respiratory sample tested, was 13% (95% CI: 4 - 38%). ConclusionsThe enhanced contact tracing investigations undertaken around nine early travel-related cases of COVID-19 in the United States identified two cases of secondary transmission, both spouses. Rapid detection and isolation of the travel-associated case patients, enabled by public awareness of COVID-19 among travelers from China, may have mitigated transmission risk among close contacts of these cases.
