Promoting Data Sharing: The Moral Obligations of Public Funding Agencies.

Sharing research data has great potential to benefit science and society. However, data sharing is still not common practice. Since public research funding agencies have a particular impact on research and researchers, the question arises: Are public funding agencies morally obligated to promote data sharing? We argue from a research ethics perspective that public funding agencies have several pro tanto obligations requiring them to promote data sharing. However, there are also pro tanto obligations that speak against promoting data sharing in general as well as with regard to particular instruments of such promotion. We examine and weigh these obligations and conclude that all things considered funders ought to promote the sharing of data. Even the instrument of mandatory data sharing policies can be justified under certain conditions.

Theory vs. experiment: The rise of the dynamic view of proteins.

Over the past century, the scientific conception of the protein has evolved significantly. This paper focuses on the most recent stage of this evolution, namely, the origin of the dynamic view of proteins and the challenge it posed to the static view of classical molecular biology. Philosophers and scientists have offered two hypotheses to explain the origin of the dynamic view and its slow reception by structural biologists. Some have argued that the shift from the static to the dynamic view was a Kuhnian revolution, driven by the accumulation of dynamic anomalies, while others have argued that the shift was caused by new empirical findings made possible by technological advances. I analyze this scientific episode and ultimately reject both of these empiricist accounts. I argue that focusing primarily on technological advances and empirical discoveries overlooks the important role of theory in driving this scientific change. I show how the application of general thermodynamic principles to proteins gave rise to the dynamic view, and a commitment to these principles then led early adopters to seek out the empirical examples of protein dynamics, which would eventually convince their peers. My analysis of this historical case shows that empiricist accounts of modern scientific progress-at least those that aim to explain developments in the molecular life sciences-need to be tempered in order to capture the interplay between theory and experiment.

Redefining the scientific method: as the use of sophisticated scientific methods that extend our mind.

Scientific, medical, and technological knowledge has transformed our world, but we still poorly understand the nature of scientific methodology. Science textbooks, science dictionaries, and science institutions often state that scientists follow, and should follow, the universal scientific method of testing hypotheses using observation and experimentation. Yet, scientific methodology has not been systematically analyzed using large-scale data and scientific methods themselves as it is viewed as not easily amenable to scientific study. Using data on all major discoveries across science including all Nobel Prize and major non-Nobel Prize discoveries, we can address the question of the extent to which "the scientific method" is actually applied in making science's groundbreaking research and whether we need to expand this central concept of science. This study reveals that 25% of all discoveries since 1900 did not apply the common scientific method (all three features)-with 6% of discoveries using no observation, 23% using no experimentation, and 17% not testing a hypothesis. Empirical evidence thus challenges the common view of the scientific method. Adhering to it as a guiding principle would constrain us in developing many new scientific ideas and breakthroughs. Instead, assessing all major discoveries, we identify here a general, common feature that the method of science can be reduced to: making all major discoveries has required using sophisticated methods and instruments of science. These include statistical methods, particle accelerators, and X-ray methods. Such methods extend our mind and generally make observing, experimenting, and testing hypotheses in science possible, doing so in new ways and ensure their replicability. This provides a new perspective to the scientific method-embedded in our sophisticated methods and instruments-and suggests that we need to reform and extend the way we view the scientific method and discovery process.

Kuhnian Lessons for the Study of Open-Ended Evolution.

Kuhnian philosophy of science implies that progress in the study of open-ended evolution (OEE) would be accelerated if the OEE science community were to agree on some examples of striking success in OEE science. This article recounts the important role of scientific paradigms and scientific exemplars in creating the productivity of what Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, calls "normal" science, and it describes how the study of OEE today would benefit from exhibiting more of the hallmarks of normal science. The article concludes by describing five proposed projects that would help create a consensus in the OEE community on some good examples of the scientific study of OEE.

On the concept of systematization in the Kemeny-Oppenheim approach to intertheoretical reduction.

In 1956, John G. Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim proposed an approach to intertheoretical reduction as an alternative to that of Ernest Nagel. However, they neglected to provide a clear definition of its basic concept of systematization. After decades of languishing in the shadows, new interest in the KO approach is emerging. Nevertheless, there are still misunderstandings regarding this basic concept. The present paper elucidates this concept by returning to Oppenheim's hitherto little-noticed publications from the 1920s and 1930s, which Kemeny and Oppenheim obviously used as guidance in 1956. Reappraising Oppenheim's early writings delivers two significant payoffs: new clarity in understanding the concept of systematization as well as a more solid grasp of the structure of this approach as a distinctive combination of explanation and systematization.

The Evolution of Flow Chemistry: An Opinion on Factors Driving Innovation.

This article seeks to provide an overview of the environmental factors within the pharmaceutical industry that have contributed to the emergence of flow chemistry over the past two decades. It highlights some of the challenges facing the industry and describes how they are being overcome by the exponential trajectory of scientific progress in the area. We identify current trends and offer a speculative glimpse into the future of drug development and manufacturing with some examples of progress being made at CARBOGEN AMCIS.

Scientific progress: By-whom or for-whom?

When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements to the cognitive attitudes of those for whom progress is made, i.e. the receivers rather than the producers of scientific information. This includes not only scientists themselves, but also various other individuals who utilize scientific information in different ways for the benefit of society as a whole.

Analyzing some concepts of immune regulation of the last three decades: Fostering greater research resilience despite the information overload. A personal view.

There is considerable interest in whether increased investment in science, made by society, pays dividends. Some plausibly argue the increased rate of production of information results in an ossification of the canon. Reports, challenging the canon, fall by the wayside. The field thus becomes increasingly complex, reflecting not so much the reality of nature but how we investigate the subject. I suggest that focusing on and resolving the paradoxes evident within a canon will free the logjam, resulting in more resilient research. Immunology is among the fastest growing of biological sciences and is, I suggest, an appropriate case study. I examine the commonly accepted frameworks employed over the last three decades to address two major, related immunological questions: what determines whether antigen activates or inactivates CD4 T cells, and so whether immune responses are initiated or this potential ablated; secondly, what determines the Th subset to which the activated Th cells belong, thus determining the class of immunity generated. I show there are major paradoxes within these frameworks, neglected for decades. I propose how research focused on resolving paradoxes can be better fostered, and so support the evolution of the canon. This perspective is pertinent in facing critical issues on how immune responses are regulated, and to more general issues of both the philosophy of science and of science policy.The last section is in response to questions and comments of the reviewers. It brings together several considerations to express my view: the same frameworks, formulated in response to the two questions, are useful in understanding the regulation of the immune response against model antigens, against self and foreign antigens, those of tumors and of pathogens.

Understanding and scientific progress: lessons from epistemology.

Contemporary debate surrounding the nature of scientific progress has focused upon the precise role played by justification, with two realist accounts having dominated proceedings. Recently, however, a third realist account has been put forward, one which offers no role for justification at all. According to Finnur Dellsén's (Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 56:72-83, 2016) noetic account, science progresses when understanding increases, that is, when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world that they could before. In this paper, we argue that the noetic account is severely undermotivated. Dellsén provides three examples intended to show that understanding can increase absent the justification required for true belief to constitute knowledge. However, we demonstrate that a lack of clarity in each case allows for two contrasting interpretations, neither of which serves its intended purpose. On the first, the agent involved lacks both knowledge and understanding; and, on the second, the agent involved successfully gains both knowledge and understanding. While neither interpretation supports Dellsén's claim that understanding can be prised apart from knowledge, we argue that, in general, agents in such cases ought to be attributed neither knowledge nor understanding. Given that the separability of knowledge and understanding is a necessary component of the noetic account, we conclude that there is little support for the idea that science progresses through increasing understanding rather than the accumulation of knowledge.

Is psychological science progressing? Explained variance in PsycINFO articles during the period 1956 to 2022.

We aimed to numerically assess the progress of modern psychological science. Average explained variance in 1565 included articles was 42.8 percent, and this was constant during 1956 to 2022. We explored whether this could be explained by a combination of methodological conventions with the semantic properties of the involved variables. Using latent semantic analysis (LSA) on a random sample of 50 studies from the 1,565, we were able to replicate the possible semantic factor structures of 205 constructs reported in the corresponding articles. We argue that the methodological conventions pertaining to factor structures will lock the possible explained variance within mathematical constraints that will make most statistics cluster around 40 percent explained variance. Hypotheses with close to 100 percent semantic truth value will never be part of any assumed empirical study. Nor will hypotheses approaching zero truth value. Hypotheses with around 40 percent truth value will probably be experienced as empirical and plausible and, consequently, as good candidates for psychological research. Therefore, to the extent that the findings were indeed produced by semantic structures, they could have been known without collecting data. Finally, we try to explain why psychology had to abandon an individual, causal method and switch to studying whether associations among variables at the group level differ from chance. Psychological processes take place in indefinitely complex and irreversibly changing contexts. The prevalent research paradigm seems bound to producing theoretical statements that explain each other to around 40%. Any theoretical progress would need to address and transcend this barrier.

Slowed canonical progress in large fields of science.

In many academic fields, the number of papers published each year has increased significantly over time. Policy measures aim to increase the quantity of scientists, research funding, and scientific output, which is measured by the number of papers produced. These quantitative metrics determine the career trajectories of scholars and evaluations of academic departments, institutions, and nations. Whether and how these increases in the numbers of scientists and papers translate into advances in knowledge is unclear, however. Here, we first lay out a theoretical argument for why too many papers published each year in a field can lead to stagnation rather than advance. The deluge of new papers may deprive reviewers and readers the cognitive slack required to fully recognize and understand novel ideas. Competition among many new ideas may prevent the gradual accumulation of focused attention on a promising new idea. Then, we show data supporting the predictions of this theory. When the number of papers published per year in a scientific field grows large, citations flow disproportionately to already well-cited papers; the list of most-cited papers ossifies; new papers are unlikely to ever become highly cited, and when they do, it is not through a gradual, cumulative process of attention gathering; and newly published papers become unlikely to disrupt existing work. These findings suggest that the progress of large scientific fields may be slowed, trapped in existing canon. Policy measures shifting how scientific work is produced, disseminated, consumed, and rewarded may be called for to push fields into new, more fertile areas of study.

The algorithmic turn in conservation biology: Characterizing progress in ethically-driven sciences.

As a discipline distinct from ecology, conservation biology emerged in the 1980s as a rigorous science focused on protecting biodiversity. Two algorithmic breakthroughs in information processing made this possible: place-prioritization algorithms and geographical information systems. They provided defensible, data-driven methods for designing reserves to conserve biodiversity that obviated the need for largely intuitive and highly problematic appeals to ecological theory at the time. But the scientific basis of these achievements and whether they constitute genuine scientific progress has been criticized. We counter by pointing out important inaccuracies about the science and rejecting the apparent theory-first focus. More broadly, the case study reveals significant limitations of the predominant epistemic-semantic conceptions of scientific progress and the considerable merits of pragmatic, practically-oriented accounts.

Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account.

What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it (thus interpreted). Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive change with respect to a topic X constitutes a scientific improvement (to a greater or lesser extent) with respect to X. The answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change occurs when scientific results are made publicly available so as to make it possible for anyone to increase their understanding of X. This account is briefly compared to two rival accounts of scientific progress, based respectively on increasing truthlikeness and accumulating knowledge, and is argued to be preferable to both.

[Historical (cultural) view of the heart and cardiovascular system]. / Herz und Herz-Kreislauf-System in der (kultur-)historischen Betrachtung.

Who discovered the cardiovascular and capillary systems? When students in advanced semesters are asked about historical matters that have decisively influenced the path to present day medicine, as a rule no answer or a false answer is forthcoming. Whoever wants to understand scientific thinking and action, cannot do better than to grapple with the historical and cultural developments in medicine; however, more than any other science the natural sciences and medicine provide evidence that new ways and knowledge must be consistently sought for the benefit of patients. The aim of this article is to make a contribution to remembering how the cardiovascular system was discovered and the cultural and historical importance of the heart. Last but not least, however, the article aims to convey the impression of the huge personal sacrifice, including one's own life, and the stony path which led to the acquisition of this knowledge.

On the Distinction Between Personal Standards Perfectionism and Excellencism: A Theory Elaboration and Research Agenda.

Research on perfectionism is flourishing, but the unspecified distinction between perfectionism and the pursuit of excellence is a lingering issue that urgently needs conceptual, theoretical, and empirical attention. In this article, excellence and perfection are defined as distinct goals that form the basis of two different but related constructs. To move this idea forward, the term excellencism is introduced. Perfectionism and excellencism are defined and their similarities and differences are illustrated using symbolic logic and adjectives from the English lexicon. A point is made to clearly indicate that excellencism is a required reference point for reassessing the healthiness or unhealthiness of personal standards perfectionism. Using the law of diminishing returns as an analogy, a theory-driven rationale is proposed, and three alternative hypotheses are formulated. Showing that personal standards perfectionism is associated with better, comparable, and worse outcomes compared with excellencism offers the needed and sufficient conditions for respectively supporting the hypothesis that perfectionism is a healthy, unneeded, or deleterious pursuit. The propositions advanced in this theoretical article are more than incremental, and their practical implications are far-reaching: If personal standards perfectionism yields no added value or deleterious outcomes over and above excellencism, then excellence rather than perfection should be promoted.

Persistence of false paradigms in low-power sciences.

We develop a model describing how false paradigms may persist, hindering scientific progress. The model features two paradigms, one describing reality better than the other. Tenured scientists display homophily: They favor tenure candidates who adhere to their paradigm. As in statistics, power is the probability (absent any bias) of denying tenure to scientists adhering to the false paradigm. The model shows that because of homophily, when power is low, the false paradigm may prevail. Then, only an increase in power can ignite convergence to the true paradigm. Historical case studies suggest that low power comes either from lack of empirical evidence or from reluctance to base tenure decisions on available evidence.

Implications of the Credibility Revolution for Productivity, Creativity, and Progress.

The credibility revolution (sometimes referred to as the "replicability crisis") in psychology has brought about many changes in the standards by which psychological science is evaluated. These changes include (a) greater emphasis on transparency and openness, (b) a move toward preregistration of research, (c) more direct-replication studies, and (d) higher standards for the quality and quantity of evidence needed to make strong scientific claims. What are the implications of these changes for productivity, creativity, and progress in psychological science? These questions can and should be studied empirically, and I present my predictions here. The productivity of individual researchers is likely to decline, although some changes (e.g., greater collaboration, data sharing) may mitigate this effect. The effects of these changes on creativity are likely to be mixed: Researchers will be less likely to pursue risky questions; more likely to use a broad range of methods, designs, and populations; and less free to define their own best practices and standards of evidence. Finally, the rate of scientific progress-the most important shared goal of scientists-is likely to increase as a result of these changes, although one's subjective experience of making progress will likely become rarer.

A cumulative meta-analysis of the effects of individual physical activity interventions targeting healthy adults.

Despite a large and increasing evidence base on physical activity interventions, the high rates of physical inactivity and associated chronic diseases are continuing to increase globally. The purpose of this cumulative meta-analysis was to investigate the evolution of randomized controlled trial evidence of individual-level physical activity interventions to asses if new trials are contributing novel evidence to the field. Through a two-staged search process, primary studies examining the effects of interventions targeted at increasing physical activity within healthy adult populations were pooled and selected from eligible systematic reviews. Cumulative meta-analyses were performed on effect sizes immediately post-intervention (n = 62), and for long-term behaviour change (≥12-month post-baseline; n = 27). Sufficiency and stability of the evidence was assessed through application of pre-published indicators. Meta-analyses suggest overall positive intervention effects on physical activity. The evidence base for effectiveness immediately post-intervention reached levels of sufficiency and stability in 2007; and for long-term follow-up in 2011. In the time since, intervention effectiveness has not substantially changed, and further trials are unlikely to change the direction and magnitude of effect. Substantial evidence exists demonstrating that physical activity interventions can modify individual behaviour in controlled settings. Researchers are urged to shift focus towards investigating the optimization, implementation, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of interventions.

Scientific progress despite irreproducibility: A seeming paradox.

It appears paradoxical that science is producing outstanding new results and theories at a rapid rate at the same time that researchers are identifying serious problems in the practice of science that cause many reports to be irreproducible and invalid. Certainly, the practice of science needs to be improved, and scientists are now pursuing this goal. However, in this perspective, we argue that this seeming paradox is not new, has always been part of the way science works, and likely will remain so. We first introduce the paradox. We then review a wide range of challenges that appear to make scientific success difficult. Next, we describe the factors that make science work-in the past, present, and presumably also in the future. We then suggest that remedies for the present practice of science need to be applied selectively so as not to slow progress and illustrate with a few examples. We conclude with arguments that communication of science needs to emphasize not just problems but the enormous successes and benefits that science has brought and is now bringing to all elements of modern society.